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The explosion of “a massive deportation and detention infrastructure” in recent years has
spurred a new era of advocacy in immigration law. 1 Statutory changes that expand detention and
deportation while simultaneously restricting judicial review 2 have both increased enforcement
and fundamentally reshaped the immigration field. One major change has been to the
longstanding existence of habeas jurisdiction to contest the legality of executive detention and
deportation. 3 In 2001, the Supreme Court held that despite statutory changes, habeas jurisdiction
remained available in two vital contexts: to review legal questions in removal decisions in St.
Cyr, 4 and to “challenge detention that is without statutory authority” in Zadyvdas. 5 This essay
focuses on the latter type of case—challenges to detention—and one tool for bringing those
challenges on a scale that helps keep pace with the growth of immigration detention: habeas
class actions.
Habeas class actions have been an important method for bringing structural reform
challenges to immigration detention for several decades now, 6 but in one that recently made it to
the Supreme Court—Jennings v. Rodriguez—the Court divided on key questions of jurisdiction

1
See Stephen Manning & Juliet Stumpf, Big Immigration Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 412-14 (2018)
(describing how today’s large-scale immigration enforcement has led to new models of collective representation and
advocacy).
2
See generally Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (hereinafter “IIRIRA”).
3
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305-06 (2001) (summarizing the historical ability of noncitizens to challenge
detention and removal through the writ of habeas corpus); Jill Family, Threats to the Future of the Immigration
Class Action, 27 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 71, 82 (2008) (reviewing congressional restrictions on judicial review of
immigration).
4
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 310.
5
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
6
The University of Michigan’s Civil Rights Litigation database returns 31 results since 1981 for immigration
detention cases in which both habeas relief and class status were sought. CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
CLEARINGHOUSE, UNIV. MICH., https://www.clearinghouse.net/search.php.
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and expressed skepticism about whether a class action was appropriate for the relief sought. 7
Similar jurisdictional concerns were echoed by a divided Court the next year in Nielsen v.
Preap. 8 Lower courts have continued certifying habeas classes in the wake of these two cases,
but they illustrate the difficulties of bringing a successful habeas class action even where it is
theoretically possible.
In Part I, I give a brief overview of the history and legal framework of habeas corpus and
civil immigration detention, along with examples of how habeas class actions have been used to
challenge elements of each of the major detention schemes. In Part II, I describe some obstacles
to habeas class actions: statutory restrictions, Rule 23, standing, exhaustion, and mootness, with
a few examples of habeas classes that have overcome those obstacles or failed to. Part III
reviews the importance of habeas class actions in immigration, and argues that both habeas and
class actions should be interpreted expansively as a necessary backstop to arbitrary detention.
I.

Overview and Framework
a. Historical Background
The Writ of Habeas Corpus, which stretches back to English common law and is

enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, is celebrated as one of the great protections of liberty in our
democratic society. 9 It occupies a unique space in legal procedure, encompassing elements of
“civil, appellate, collateral, equitable, common law, and statutory procedure.” 10 Unfortunately, in
the U.S. today it offers relief to only the smallest fraction of petitioners and has arguably failed

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 851 (2018) (the Ninth Circuit to reassess jurisdiction and “whether
respondents can continue litigating their claims as a class”).
8
See generally Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) (dividing over the issue of jurisdiction).
9
ANTHONY GREGORY, THE POWER OF HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA: FROM THE KING’S PREROGATIVE TO THE WAR
ON TERROR 2 (Cambridge University Press 2013).
10
RANDY HERTZ & JAMES LIEBMAN, 1 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.2 (7th ed., 2018).
7
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as a meaningful check on the state’s detention power. 11 This has led commentators to suggest
that for habeas corpus to truly protect individual liberty, it should be dramatically reformed. 12
The idea that habeas class actions “should be welcomed in view of the burden on the
federal courts resulting from the vast increase in habeas corpus applications” is neither new nor
surprising in light of the massive scale of incarceration in the U.S. 13 Between the 1960s and
1990s, they were used in the criminal context, as “[h]abeas corpus class action representatives
sought to litigate common issues on claims that criminal convictions were unconstitutional or
violated federal law… such as access to counsel in capital cases, access to legal materials,
disparate sentences for juveniles, and the constitutionality of the death penalty.” 14 The
exhaustion requirements imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) made joinder in post-conviction habeas cases all but impossible, and the Supreme
Court in Calderon v. Ashmus held that the Declaratory Judgment Act could not be used to
challenge an AEDPA provision before the class members had filed habeas petitions and met
those requirements. 15 Although not a habeas class action itself, the reasoning in Calderon

GREGORY, supra note 9 at 293-96 (describing how the sheer size of the modern U.S. detention state renders
habeas as traditionally construed an ineffective remedy for the vast majority of prisoners); Eve Brensike Primus, A
Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (arguing that “federal habeas review of state
convictions has become a waste of resources while providing almost no real relief, even to deserving petitioners”).
12
See GREGORY, supra note 9 at 309 (arguing for reconsideration of Tarble’s Case “to restore habeas corpus as it
once was – a states’ right against federal detention power”); Brensike Primus, supra note 11 at 7 (proposing a model
in which “a petitioner… would also have to produce some evidence that the violation was systemic rather than an
idiosyncratic error in his case”).
13
See Multiparty Federal Habeas Corpus, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1483 (1968) (suggesting habeas class actions
could reduce the burden of post-conviction petitions on federal courts).
14
Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 404-05 (2007); see also HERTZ &
LIEBMAN, supra note 10 at § 11.4, fn. 9 (collecting habeas class action cases).
15
Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747-48 (1998) (“[A]ny claim by a prisoner attacking the validity or duration
of his confinement must be brought under the habeas sections of Title 28…. this means that a state prisoner is
required to exhaust state remedies before bringing his claim to a federal court. But if respondent Ashmus is allowed
to maintain the present action, he would obtain a declaration as to the applicable statute of limitations in a federal
habeas action without ever having shown that he has exhausted state remedies.”).
11

4|Habeas Class Actions, December 2019
dramatically curtailed class action habeas as a potential method for structural challenges by state
prisoners, leading one scholar to decry it as “the end of the habeas corpus class action.” 16
But collateral review of criminal convictions is not the only context in which habeas class
actions can be brought. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 remains a pathway for individuals to challenge
executive detention, including in the immigration context. 17 Just as the large number of postconviction habeas petitions is related to the massive size of the U.S. criminal justice system, 18 as
immigration detention has expanded in scope and size over the past several years, 19 habeas
petitions challenging that confinement have increased, as well. 20
Immigration detention is at its most massive level ever. At the end of 2018, ICE was
holding 47,486 individuals in 215 facilities across the country, about 10% of whom had been
detained over six months. 21 In contrast, the average daily population of immigrant detainees in
1994 was 6,785. 22 Just as the U.S. outpaces the rest of the world in incarceration, it outpaces the
rest of the world in immigration detention, for example by admitting 323,591 individuals to
detention in 2017 compared to only 28,978 in the UK that same year. 23 Although immigration
detention is not criminal, “civil detention” is very much a legal fiction. 24 Immigrant detainees are
housed in jails, often alongside criminal inmates, and have their freedom restricted. 25 Given the

Garrett, supra note 14 at 406.
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2018).
18
GREGORY, supra note 9 at 294-95.
19
Emily Ryo, Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 117, 121 (2016) (detailing the
expansion of immigration detention since the 1980s alongside a rise in “tough on crime” rhetoric).
20
See Suits Challenging Confinement of Noncitizens Up, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE
(TRAC) IMMIGRATION (Sept. 20, 2018) (reporting a 98.6% increase in immigration habeas filings between August
2013 and August 2018).
21
ICE Focus Shifts Away from Detaining Serious Criminals, TRAC IMMIGRATION 1-2 (June 25, 2019)
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/564/.
22
Emily Ryo, Understanding Immigration Detention, 15 ANN. L. & SOC. REV. 97, 101 (2019).
23
Id. at 99.
24
Cesar Garcia Hernandez, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 97 B. U. L. REV. 245, 252-57 (2017) (describing how
the experience of immigration detention is indistinguishable from criminal punishment).
25
Id.; Ryo, Understanding Immigration Detention, supra note 22 at 104-05.
16
17
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slow pace of immigration proceedings, an individual who chooses to fight their case may face
years in jail, not to mention a lower chance of success on the merits. 26
b. Legal Framework of Immigration Detention
This massive scale of detention is authorized and implemented by statutory provisions of
the INA, regulations, and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) case law. There are four main
statutory provisions that authorize detention: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1226(c), 1225(b), and
1231(a), and each has its own nuances that have been challenged through habeas class actions.
The permissive detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), allows an immigration judge to
detain a person pending adjudication of their case, or release them on conditional parole or a
bond not less than $1,500. 27 The BIA places the burden of proof on the detainee to show that he
or she is not a danger to society or a flight risk. 28 If the detainee fails to meet the burden of
showing he or she is not a danger, bond is denied. 29 The amount is supposed to guarantee future
appearance in court, but the BIA has stated in multiple unpublished cases that ability to pay is
irrelevant. 30 Whether to grant bond, the amount, and how to weigh the factors are
discretionary. 31
Multiple aspects of § 1226(a) bond hearings have been challenged through class actions
seeking habeas relief. For example, immigration judges in the Ninth Circuit are now required to
26
Two interactive datasets from TRAC Immigration allow us to reach this conclusion. Immigration Court
Processing Time by Outcome, TRAC IMMIGRATION (last visited Nov. 17, 2019)
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/court_proctime_outcome.php (setting the graph to average
days for the entire U.S. shows a dramatic rise in processing time, reaching an average of 578 days to resolve a case
in fiscal year 2018); Details on Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Court, TRAC IMMIGRATION,
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/ immigration/nta/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2019) (filtering by custody and outcome shows
that a full 93% of detained individuals since 2001 were ordered removed or accepted voluntary departure, compared
to only 39% of those who were never detained).
27
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This is also referred to as 236(a) detention, after its numeration in the INA.
28
Matter of Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1113 (B.I.A. 1999).
29
Matter of Drysdale, 20 I. & N. Dec. 815, 817 (B.I.A. 1994).
30
See, e.g., Lopez-Ramirez, 2011 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 6685 (B.I.A. June 27, 2011); Serrano-Cordova, 2009 Immig.
Rptr. LEXIS 2444 (B.I.A. April 21, 2009).
31
Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 39 (BIA 2006).
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consider ability to pay when setting bond as a result of the habeas class action Hernandez v.
Sessions, which successfully argued that failure to do so led to unconstitutional imprisonment for
poverty. 32 Many courts have found that due process requires the government to bear the burden
of proof in a § 1226(a) bond hearing, 33 including a recent habeas class action, Brito v. Barr. 34
In contrast, under the mandatory detention scheme of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), immigrants
with certain criminal convictions are detained without bond. 35 Mandatory detention began in
1990, 36 but the list of crimes expanded considerably in IIRIRA. 37 Section 1226(c) crossreferences the removability and inadmissibility provisions, and includes crimes relating to
controlled substances, 38 a list of “aggravated felonies”—which may not even be felonies, 39 and
“crimes involving moral turpitude.” 40 An individual detained under § 1226(c) has the right to an
initial “Joseph hearing” to contest that classification. 41 While § 1226(c) uses the phrase “take
into custody,” 42 the BIA has interpreted that to require detention rather than alternatives like
Hernandez v. Lynch, 2016 WL 7116611 (C. D. Cal. 2016) (certifying habeas class) (affirmed by Hernandez v.
Sessions, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017)).
33
See, e.g., Darko v. Sessions, 342 F.Supp.3d 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Diaz-Ceja v. McAleenan, 2019 WL 2774211
(D. Colo. 2019).
34
Brito v. Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d 135 (D. Mass. 2019) (certifying habeas class) (summary judgment granted, Brito v.
Barr, No. 19-11314-PBS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206578 (D. Mass. Nov. 27, 2019)).
35
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). This is also referred to as 236(c) detention, for INA § 236(c).
36
Immigration Act of 1990, H.R. 101-955 § 504(a)(5), Cong. 101, 2d sess. (Oct. 26, 1990) (amending INA § 236, or
8 U.S.C. § 1226, by adding a new subsection on mandatory detention).
37
IIRIRA, supra note 2 at § 303(a) (amending 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) to require mandatory detention for a list of criminal
inadmissibility or removability grounds).
38
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2018) (making controlled substances violations grounds for inadmissibility); 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (making controlled substances convictions other than small amounts of marijuana a
removable offense).
39
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2018). “Aggravated felony” is in turn defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) and lists
offenses like theft (G), failure to appear in court (T), and obstruction of justice (S); although whether a conviction is
an aggravated felony depends on the length of the sentence and the elements of the state law. The list also includes a
“crime of violence,” which is defined in yet another section of the U.S. Code, part of which was found to be
unconstitutionally vague in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
40
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(I)(i) (making crimes involving moral turpitude grounds for inadmissibility); 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(i-ii) (making crimes involving moral turpitude removable offenses). The term “crime involving moral
turpitude” is not defined in the INA, and is addressed on a case-by-case basis by applying the categorical approach
to each given state statute. See, e.g., Diaz-Lizarraga 26 I. & N. Dec. 847, 852 (B.I.A. 2016) (“updat[ing]” its prior
caselaw to define a state shoplifting statute as a crime involving moral turpitude).
41
Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 805 (B.I.A. 1999).
42
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1).
32
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electronic monitoring. 43 Thus, an individual may be detained under this provision for years while
his or her case moves through immigration court, resulting in an extended loss of liberty. 44
The facial constitutionality of mandatory detention was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Demore v. Kim, 45 but multiple circuits have determined that Due Process requires reading an
implicit reasonableness requirement into § 1226(c) making detention unconstitutional when
“prolonged.” 46 One such case, which set a bright-line rule requiring a bond hearing following six
months of prolonged detention in the Ninth Circuit, was the habeas class action that reached the
Supreme Court as Jennings v. Rodriguez. 47 Two habeas classes that reached the Supreme Court a
year later as Nielsen v. Preap challenged the government’s application of § 1226(c) to
individuals who had been released from criminal custody—sometimes years earlier—before
being detained by ICE, on the basis that § 1226(c) only requires the Secretary to take those
individuals into custody “when the alien is released.” 48 The Court rejected that argument on the
merits, but splintered on the questions of jurisdiction for judicial review and mootness. 49

43
Aguilar-Aquino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 747, 752 (B.I.A. 2009). See also Philip L. Torrey, Rethinking Immigration's
Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics, Profit, and the Meaning of “Custody”, 48 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 879, 90710 (2015) (criticizing Aguilar-Aquino and arguing that “custody” should be interpreted more broadly). This
interpretation contradicts much of the current habeas jurisprudence, which has interpreted custody to include
restrictions on liberty like probation or bail. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 10 at § 8.2(d) (collecting cases
defining “custody” for the purposes of habeas jurisdiction).
44
Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 2141, 2147-48 (2017) (describing
mandatory detention and its impact on individuals pursuing relief).
45
Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 530 (2003). Demore was a habeas case, though not a class action. See
also Alex Sirota, Note: Locked Up: Demore, Mandatory Detention, and the Fifth Amendment, 74 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 2337, 2366-70 (criticizing the Demore decision).
46
After Demore, a split arose between circuits that required a case-by-case determination of when detention became
“unreasonable,” and those that set a bright-line rule of six months after which detention became presumptively
unreasonable. Sirota, supra note 45; compare Sopo v. Attorney General, 825 F.3d 1199, 1215 (11th Cir. 2016); Reid
v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 497 (1st Cir. 2016); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2011);
Hoang Minh Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 273 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting a fact-specific analysis); with Rodriguez v.
Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013); Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 606 (2d Cir. 2015) (adopting a
bright-line rule of six months).
47
Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d at 1138.
48
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 964 (2019).
49
See id. at 962-63 (finding jurisdiction to review in the plurality section of the opinion).
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If an arriving immigrant is inadmissible, he or she is known as an “arriving alien” and is
subject to expedited removal without a hearing. 50 However, if he or she indicates a fear of
persecution, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) states that he or she “shall be detained pending a final
determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until
removed.” 51 If found to have a credible fear, a person may be paroled into the U.S. 52 or “shall be
detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” 53 For years, individuals who
passed a credible fear interview and were transferred to removal proceedings were eligible for
bond, 54 but over the summer, Attorney General Barr set a new precedent that they are instead
subject to mandatory detention as long as their asylum proceedings last. 55 That interpretation was
challenged—and enjoined—by a nation-wide habeas class action in Padilla v. ICE. 56
The final type of detention is 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which covers individuals subject to final
removal orders. 57 It begins when a removal order becomes administratively final, and allows the

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Despite the broad language in § 1225(b), case law recognizes a distinction between
permanent residents returning from a brief trip abroad and arriving aliens with no status. Compare Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (holding that a legal permanent resident returning from a brief trip is entitled to
due process in exclusion proceedings) with Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)
(holding that the executive’s decision to exclude an arriving alien was unreviewable). Either way, the right to due
process in admission proceedings is distinct from the right to be free from arbitrary detention while those
proceedings take place. PRACTICE ADVISORY: PROLONGED DETENTION CHALLENGES AFTER JENNINGS V. RODRIGUEZ
15-16, ACLU (March 21, 2018) https://www.aclu.org/other/ practice-advisory-prolonged-detention-challenges-afterjennings-v-rodriguez.
51
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
52
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). A recent class action, though not a habeas petition, received a preliminary injunction
requiring five ICE Field Offices to comply with its own internal directive when parole grant rates suddenly dropped
from over 90% to nearly 0% following a change in administration. Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317 (D.D.C.
2018).
53
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).
54
See In re X- K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731, 736 (B.I.A. May 4, 2005) (“[T]hose provisions do not expressly alter the
jurisdiction conferred by the regulations on Immigration Judges to redetermine the custody status of aliens in
removal proceedings.”).
55
See In re M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 509 (B.I.A. April 16, 2019) (“There is no way to apply those provisions
except as they were written--unless paroled, an alien must be detained until his asylum claim is adjudicated.”).
56
See Padilla v. ICE, 387 F.Supp.3d 1219, 1229 (W.D. Wash., July 2, 2019) (modifying a prior preliminary
injunction to enjoin the new interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)), stay of preliminary injunction lifted in
relevant part, Padilla v. ICE, No. 19-35565, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 21846 (9th Cir. July 22, 2019).
57
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).
50
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government to detain someone for 90 days to effectuate deportation. 58 The removal of detainees
to countries that lacked a functioning government to accept them was challenged under this
statute through early habeas class actions, but ultimately that challenge was rejected on the
merits. 59 If removal is not possible in 90 days, the individual may be released under
supervision, 60 or may continue to be held if they are “a risk to the community or unlikely to
comply with the order of removal.” 61 DHS initially took the position that it could detain
individuals indefinitely under this provision, but the Supreme Court held that detention under §
1231(a)(6) was presumptively reasonable for only six months, and that “once removal is no
longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute” in
Zadvydas v. Davis. 62
This section also covers individuals who have been deported and returned to the
country. 63 Instead they are subject to “reinstatement” of the original removal order, with no
opportunity to apply for relief unless they can show a reasonable fear of torture to qualify for
withholding of removal, a form of relief similar to asylum with a higher evidentiary threshold. 64
Whether an individual whose fear is found reasonable is subject to mandatory detention under §
1231(a)(6) or is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a) during withholding-only proceedings
is currently a circuit split, but all the courts to address it have determined that either statutory

58

Id.
See Ali v. Ashcroft, 213 F.R.D. 390, 396 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (seeking to enjoin detention and deportation of a
class of Somalis who could not be deported because there was no functioning government of Somalia to accept
them). This decision was vacated following the Supreme Court’s decision in Jama v. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005), which held that § 1231(b) did not require consent from the country of removal.
Ali v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 795, 796 (9th Cir. 2005) (vacating and remanding to reconsider class certification).
60
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).
61
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
62
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699, 701 (2001). Zadvydas was a consolidation of two habeas cases, in one of
which the district court considered “about 100 similar cases together [and] issued a joint order.” Id. at 686.
63
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).
64
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
59
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scheme requires a bond hearing following prolonged detention. 65 Recently, the Eastern District
of Virginia certified, and granted summary judgment to, a habeas class of immigrants in
withholding-only proceedings, entitling them to an individualized bond hearing. 66 Two more
habeas class actions currently being litigated in the Ninth Circuit argue that due process entitles §
1231(a)(6) detainees to a bond hearing following six months of detention. 67
Jennings v. Rodriguez was a habeas class action that challenged prolonged detention for
four subclasses of individuals held under each of these provisions. 68 The Ninth Circuit had held
that each of the statutes implicitly required bond hearings after six months of detention to avoid
an unconstitutional reading of those provisions. 69 That statutory interpretation was overturned by
the Supreme Court, but the Court remanded to consider the constitutional issue. 70 In addition, the
Court directed the Ninth Circuit to redetermine whether the class was appropriately certified and
whether there was continuing jurisdiction now that the statutory claim had been rejected. 71
II.

Potential Obstacles in Habeas Class Actions
While habeas class actions have been and continue to be creatively used to challenge

various aspects of the immigration detention scheme described above, there are major obstacles
to bringing a habeas class action in the immigration context. Lower courts have struggled with

Compare Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881, 886 (9th Cir. 2017) and Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden of York
County Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 219 (3d Cir. 2018) (determining that detention during withholding-only proceedings is
governed by § 1231(a)(6)) with Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2016) and Chavez v. Hott, 940 F.3d
867, 882 (4th Cir. 2019) (determining that § 1226(a) governs the detention of individuals withholding-only
proceedings).
66
Cabrera Diaz v. Hott, 297 F. Supp. 3d 618, 626 (E.D. Va. 2018) (affirmed by Chavez v. Hott, 940 F.3d 867 (4th
Cir. 2019)).
67
See Aleman-Gonzalez v. Sessions, 325 F.R.D. 616, 629 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (certifying class and granting
preliminary injunction) (appeal docketed, Aleman-Gonzalez v. Barr, 18-16465 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2018)); MartinezBaños v. Asher, 2018 WL 3244988 at *5 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2018) (report and recommendation adopted by
Martinez-Baños v. Asher, 2018 WL 1617706, Apr. 4, 2018) (appeal docketed, Martinez-Baños v. Godfrey, 1835460 (9th Cir. May 31, 2019)).
68
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 838-39.
69
Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d at 1138.
70
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 843.
71
Id. at 851-52.
65
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these obstacles for years, but especially after Jennings. 72 The largest obstacles are statutory
restrictions on judicial review imposed by IIRIRA 73 and the REAL ID Act. 74 Three clauses are
particularly relevant to habeas class actions: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9), 1252(f)(1), and 1226(e). In
addition, standing, mootness, and exhaustion are ever-present obstacles. Finally, Rule 23 is a
hurdle, and whether a class can be certified will generally depend on the legal question raised.
These obstacles, with examples of how courts have addressed them, are each discussed below.
a. Consolidation of questions for judicial review: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) requires that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact,
including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from
any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this
title” only be reviewable on review of a final order, and strips jurisdiction under any other
provision, including § 2241. 75 This provision was most recently amended in the REAL ID Act of
2005, 76 to specifically reference § 2241 after the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr. 77 Read
broadly, it would mean no habeas petition could be filed except with a petition for review of a
final order of removal, making detention pending that final order essentially unreviewable. 78

See Aditi Shah, Class Actions and Due Process Relief for Immigration Detainees After Jennings v. Rodriguez,
LAWFARE INSTITUTE (Oct. 29, 2019) https://www.lawfareblog.com/class-actions-and-due-process-reliefimmigration-detainees-after-jennings-v-rodriguez (describing differing analyses of class action certification in the
lower courts following Jennings).
73
See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1661 (2000)
(summarizing potential federal courts issues following IIRIRA).
74
See Castellar v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-0491-BAS-BGS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21174 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2018) at
*52-54 (unpublished) (discussing the legislative history of the REAL ID Act Amendments to the INA).
75
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
76
See The REAL ID Act, 109 Pub. L. 13, 119 Stat. 231, Subpart B, § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii) (109th Cong. 2005)
(inserting subsection (b)(9) to § 1252).
77
Family, supra note 3 at 84.
78
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 840.
72
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This was the provision that led to the split of the plurality and concurrence in Jennings, 79
and again divided the court in Preap. 80 In Jennings, the justices disagreed on whether review of
the legal question—whether bond hearings were required following six months of prolonged
detention—was foreclosed by § 1252(b)(9) because that detention could be considered “arising
from” a “proceeding brought to remove an alien.” 81 The plurality chose to interpret “arising
from” narrowly. 82 It listed types of claims such as Bivens actions or state torts that might
conceivably “arise from” detention, and concluded that “cramming judicial review of those
questions into review of final removal orders would be absurd” and “would also make claims of
prolonged detention effectively unreviewable.” 83 The concurrence disagreed, and thought that
“no court has jurisdiction over this case.” 84 The concurrence then considered whether this
restriction violated the Suspension Clause, but instead decided that the suit was not truly a
habeas petition. 85 Despite the disagreement, neither party in Jennings had even raised §
1252(b)(9) before the Supreme Court. 86 The Court divided along the exact same lines a year later
in Preap, which addressed the statutory scope of mandatory detention, with both the plurality
and concurrence reiterating their arguments in Jennings. 87

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 840, 852.
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 840.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 852.
85
Id. at 858.
86
See id. at 841 (“The parties in this case have not addressed the scope of § 1252(b)(9), and it is not necessary for us
to attempt to provide a comprehensive interpretation.”); id. at 853 (“Although neither party raises § 1252(b)(9), this
Court has an ‘independent obligation’ to assess whether it deprives us and the lower courts of jurisdiction.”)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
87
See Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 958-59 (describing the legal question); id. at 962 (referencing the earlier
reasoning in Jennings for why § 1252(b)(9) did not apply) (Alito, J., writing for the plurality); id. at 974 (referencing
earlier concurrence in Jennings for why no court has jurisdiction) (Thomas, J., concurring).
79
80
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On remand, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the plurality about its own jurisdiction, before
remanding the class certification question and constitutional question to the district court. 88
When discussing § 1252(b)(9), it quoted the plurality’s language that petitioners were “not
asking for review of an order of removal; [] not challenging the decision to detain them in the
first place or to seek removal; and [] not even challenging any part of the process by which their
removability will be determined”— only their indefinite detention during that process. 89
Since then, other lower courts have relied on the plurality’s analysis to determine when §
1252(b)(9) applies. The district court in Alvarez v. Sessions found it lacked jurisdiction over a
habeas petition 90 asserting that the transfer of petitioners between detention facilities interfered
with their right to access counsel. 91 The court discussed Jennings and determined that
“‘cramming’ issues related to legal representation during removal proceedings into the [Petition
for Review] process neither creates an absurdity in the way contemplated by the Supreme Court
in Jennings, nor places those decisions outside of meaningful judicial review.” 92
Similarly, the putative habeas class action Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen alleged that the
government’s practice of unnecessary delay in detaining immigrants prior to their first hearing
violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 93 The district court had initially dismissed those
claims for a lack of jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(9), determining that the delay “cannot be
extricated from the removal proceedings,” and rejecting the argument that challenges to

Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 255-56 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 256.
90
This particular habeas petition included ten petitioners, but did not seek class certification. Alvarez v. Sessions,
338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
91
Id. at 1045.
92
Id. at 1049. But see Singh v. Gonzalez, 499 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding, pre-Jennings, that “a narrow
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a post-administrative filing of an appeal with the court
of appeals… falls outside the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the REAL ID Act”).
93
Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2018).
88
89
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detention were categorically outside the scope of § 1252(b)(9). 94 However, it reconsidered
following Jennings. The district court determined that the clause continued to bar jurisdiction
over the Fourth Amendment claim that the petitioners were being detained prior to the hearing
without probable cause, because that claim was “challenging the decision to detain them in the
first place,” which the plurality suggested would fall under § 1252(b)(9). 95 But it reinstated the
petitioners’ Fifth Amendment claim challenging the delay in providing an initial hearing because
that delay was not a part of the removal process, and like the prolonged detention claims in
Jennings, would be “effectively unreviewable” on a petition for review. 96
b. (Possible) limit on class-wide injunctive relief: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)
Another provision of IIRIRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), limits class-wide injunctive relief. It
reads, “[N]o court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or
restrain the operation of the provisions of [this chapter] other than with respect to the application
of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such chapter have
been initiated.” 97 Legislative history suggests this clause was intended to prevent broad
injunctions that would prevent the new system from taking effect. 98 Early cases discussing this
provision lent support to the idea that courts could enjoin an unlawful interpretation of the

Castellar v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-0491-BAS-BGS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21174 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2018) at *40,
51-52.
95
Cancino-Castellar v. Nielsen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1115 (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841). The district court also
discussed how the plurality differed from prior Ninth Circuit law on § 1252(b)(9), and described the relevant
question as no longer whether a claim was “inextricably linked” or “collateral” to removal proceedings, but rather
“whether the claims otherwise challenge issues that are cognizable in the [Petition for Review] process.” Id. at 1114.
96
Id. at 1117 (citing Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840).
97
8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1).
98
See Jill Family, Another Limit on Federal Court Jurisdiction? Immigrant Access to Class-Wide Injunctive Relief,
53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 11, 31-32 (2006) (discussing the House Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 104-469 (I) at 161
(1996), which reads: “These limitations do not preclude challenges to the new procedures, but the procedures will
remain in force while such lawsuits are pending. In addition, courts may issue injunctive relief pertaining to the case
of an individual alien, and thus protect against any immediate violation of rights. However, single district courts or
courts of appeal do not have authority to enjoin procedures established by Congress to reform the process of
removing illegal aliens from the U.S.”).
94
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statutes on a class-wide basis, but that a determination of whether the law itself should be
enjoined could only be made for individually affected petitioners, or by the Supreme Court. 99
This was the argument that the Ninth Circuit relied on in the lead-up to Jennings, stating
that § 1252(f)(1) “prohibits only injunction of ‘the operation of’ the detention statutes, not
injunction of a violation of the statutes.” 100 The Supreme Court appeared to agree, as it did not
discuss § 1252(f)(1) as an obstacle to its own review, but directed the Ninth Circuit on remand to
consider whether it could still offer injunctive relief now that the statutory basis for the
injunction had been overruled, and if not, whether declaratory relief could sustain the class. 101
On remand, the Ninth Circuit concluded it had jurisdiction despite § 1252(f)(1) at
minimum to enter declaratory relief, and because “[a]ll of the individuals in the putative class are
‘individual[s] against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated’ and are pursuing
habeas claims, albeit as a class…. Section 1252(f)(1) also does not bar the habeas class action
because it lacks a clear statement repealing the court's habeas jurisdiction.” 102 The Padilla v.
ICE court soon followed this lead and found it had jurisdiction despite § 1252(f)(1) because the
class was a collection of individuals already in removal proceedings, and because this was not a
regular class action, but a habeas petition. 103 Specifically, it reasoned that “[t]here is nothing… to
indicate that, absent a specific restriction, this Court is not authorized to exercise the full panoply of
its habeas powers, including its equitable powers to enjoin conduct found unconstitutional.” 104

This same interpretation failed in Hamama v. Homan, in which the Sixth Circuit found
that while the district court had jurisdiction over the class’s prolonged detention claims, it could

Id. at 29-30 (collecting early cases).
Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).
101
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 851.
102
Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d at 256-57.
103
Order on Motions re: Preliminary Injunction, Padilla v. ICE, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1226 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
104
The district court also made a point of rejecting the adverse reasoning in Hamama, discussed infra. Id.
99

100
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not enter injunctive relief because of § 1252(f)(1). 105 The petitioners there also argued that the
statute didn’t expressly prohibit class certification, and its reference to “an . . . alien . . . against
whom proceedings under such part have been initiated” was intended as a carveout, making §
1252(f)(1) inapplicable if the entire certified class was already in immigration proceedings. 106
But the Sixth Circuit noted, “there is a big difference between barring the certification of a class
under Rule 23 and barring all injunctive relief. The former bars a class action regarding anything;
the latter only bars injunctive relief for anyone other than individuals.” 107 It also rejected the
argument that § 1252(f)(1) suspended the writ of habeas, since § 1252(f)(1) doesn’t preclude
traditional habeas relief or injunctive habeas relief for individuals. 108
Regardless of the disagreement, the carveout argument for why § 1252(f)(1) should not
apply to a given habeas class is fortunately not always necessary. First of all, class-wide
declaratory relief will often be a sufficient remedy and is still available by the plain terms of §
1252(f)(1), which the Supreme Court plurality in Preap recognized the next year. 109 Moreover,
the argument that § 1252(f)(1) doesn’t prohibit injunctive relief restraining the unlawful
interpretation of a statute still applies to a range of cases challenging interpretations and
regulations. For example, in Brito, the court held that § 1252(f)(1) didn’t apply because
petitioners were requesting an injunction against agency regulations implementing the statute,
105
Hamama v. Homan, 912 F.3d 869, 877 (6th Cir. 2018), rehearing denied, Hamama v. Adducci, No. 17-2171/181233, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 9708 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2019).
106
Id.
107
Id. at 878.
108
Id. at 879. The petitioners in Hamama also raised the argument that their request for bond hearings following
prolonged detention would not “enjoin or restrain the operations” of the detention statutes, but rather ensure that
those statutes were being correctly implemented. The Sixth Circuit rejected that argument, concluding Jennings had
foreclosed the possibility of any such statutory requirement, and went on to say that requiring bond hearings for
prolonged detention was a restraint on the operation of the statute. Still, reasonable minds can differ as to whether
forcing the government to justify prolonged, rather than initial, detention is truly a restriction on the operation of a
statute. Id. at 879-80.
109
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 962. (“Whether the [district] court had jurisdiction to enter such an injunction is
irrelevant because the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief, and for
independent reasons given below, we are ordering the dissolution of the injunction that the District Court ordered.”).
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not the statute itself. 110 The court then issued an injunction requiring the government to bear the
burden of proof in § 1226(a) bond hearings, which had been established by BIA precedent but
not mandated by statute. 111
c. Non-reviewability of discretionary decisions: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)
A final provision that presents a potential limit to habeas class actions is 8 U.S.C. §
1226(e), which states that “The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the
application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or
decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any
alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” 112 The Supreme Court has clearly
held, however, that this provision “does not preclude ‘challenges [to] the statutory framework
that permits [the alien’s] detention without bail.” 113 In other words, § 1226(e) does not bar
habeas class actions challenging the decision-making process rather than the actual decision. For
example, in Hernandez, a habeas class challenged immigration judges’ refusal to consider ability
to pay in setting bond. 114 Though bond amount is discretionary, the court found that § 1226(e)
did not bar review where the petitioner was challenging the constitutionality of the process—and
its failure to include a certain discretionary factor—rather than its application. 115 This has
continued to be the case after Jennings, including in the Ninth Circuit’s decision on remand. 116
110
See Brito v. Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 146 (“In any event, § 1252(f)(1) strips courts of jurisdiction to enjoin the
operation of the statute, not any agency regulation or precedent….”).
111
Id.
112
8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).
113
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 841 (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. at 517); Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. at
962.
114
Hernandez v. Lynch, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191881 at *33-34.
115
Id.
116
Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d at 256; see also Rivera v. Holder, 307 F.R.D. 539, 546 (W.D. Wash. 2015)
(“While an IJ's discretionary judgment in how it applies the statute is not subject to review, this Court has found no
authority supporting the notion that an IJ has the discretion to misinterpret the statute under which he operates.”). A
similar statute foreclosing judicial review of discretionary parole decisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), was found
not to be an obstacle to jurisdiction for the class of asylum seekers who challenged not the denial of parole, but the
de facto denial of an individualized determination. Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 327.
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d. Standing, Mootness, and Exhaustion
Standing has not been a major obstacle to class habeas petitions in the immigration
context before or after Jennings. In fact, Jennings did not even mention standing at all. 117 One
way it occasionally arises in the lower courts, though, is when the injury is purely procedural,
such as in discretionary bond hearings under § 1226(a). For instance, in Rivera v. Holder, the
government argued that the petitioners were not injured by the immigration judge’s refusal to
consider release on conditional parole instead of bond. 118 The court determined that the
inadequate bond hearing was a procedural injury, for which the named petitioner only needed to
show “(a) that she has a procedural right that, if exercised, ‘could’ protect her concrete interests
and (b) that those interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute at issue.” 119 It
had no trouble finding that the petitioner had an interest in an adequate bond hearing and
standing to challenge the defects in that hearing even before her detention became prolonged. 120
In contrast, mootness often presents a more difficult obstacle due to the very nature of
immigration detention. Individual immigration habeas claims are susceptible to being dismissed
as moot if the petitioner is either released, granted immigration relief, or deported before the
habeas petition is resolved. 121 When ruling on class certification, though, courts have held that
the named petitioner’s release on bond does not moot a claim if the government had the ability to

See generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830.
Rivera v. Holder, 307 F.R.D. 539, 543 (W.D. Wash. 2015).
119
Id. at 545.
120
Id. at 548.
121
See, e.g., Chen v. Lowe, No. 4:18-CV-1951, 2018 BL 409996 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 06, 2018) (dismissing a habeas
petition as moot because petitioner had been released under an order of supervision); Pierre v. Dep’t Homeland
Security, No. 3:18-CV-2302, 2019 BL 75885 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 07, 2019) (report and recommendation adopted, No.
3:18-CV-2302, 2019 BL 74910 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 05, 2019)) (dismissing a habeas case as moot because the petitioner
had been deported).
117
118
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revoke that bond and refused to “unconditionally assert that Plaintiffs will not be re-detained” 122
or if the release imposes conditions of supervision such as electronic monitoring. 123
Even where the named plaintiff’s claim is definitely mooted before certification, such as
after being unconditionally released following a grant of immigration relief, courts have been
permissive in certifying classes under the “inherently transitory” exception. 124 As the district
court explained in Hernandez, this exception is grounded in the “capable of repetition yet
evading review” exception to mootness, and allows a class to be certified even if a claim
becomes moot before certification if other class members will have the same problem and the
trial court likely could not rule on the motion before any such claim expired. 125 This exception
fits most immigration detention claims, “given the Government's ability to end the allegedly
unconstitutional detention of an alien through removal or release” in these cases. 126
The Supreme Court blessed both these lines of reasoning in the Preap plurality. When the
two habeas classes were certified below, all the named plaintiffs had been released, but the Court
held that mootness was not an obstacle because at least “one named plaintiff in both cases had
obtained release on bond, as opposed to [immigration relief], and that release had been granted
following a preliminary injunction…. Unless that preliminary injunction was made permanent
and was not disturbed on appeal, these individuals faced the threat of re-arrest and mandatory
detention.” 127 The Court went further, though, and noted that even if there had not been a live
claim, the inherently transitory exception would have applied. 128

Padilla v. ICE, 387 F. Supp. 3d at 1225.
Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d at 1118 (9th Cir. 2010).
124
See, e.g., Brito v. Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 146; Padilla v. ICE, 387 F. Supp. 3d at 1225.
125
Hernandez v. Lynch, No. EDCV 16-00620-JGB (KKx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191881 at *39 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
10, 2016) aff’d by Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19021 (9th Cir. Cal., Oct. 2, 2017).
126
Brito v. Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 146.
127
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 963.
128
Id.
122
123
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e. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not require exhaustion as a statutory matter. 129 Although some
provisions of the INA require exhaustion for review of a removal order, exhaustion is only
prudential for habeas petitions challenging detention apart from the merits of removal. 130
Exhaustion requires appeal to the BIA, 131 but this necessarily prolongs detention, and may make
habeas review impossible if the BIA is slower than the parallel immigration proceedings.
While the exact standard for when exhaustion is prudentially required varies by circuit,
there are several widely applied exceptions. 132 One of the most important is futility, which
applies where the agency lacks the power to redress the issue, or has already addressed the issue
and shows no indication that it intends to reconsider. 133 Courts have waived exhaustion as futile
even where the BIA could theoretically alter its policy if previous decisions indicate that it had
already made up its mind. 134 For example, in Hernandez, the court agreed that exhaustion would
have been futile in challenging the immigration judge’s refusal to consider ability to pay because

129
28 U.S.C. § 2241; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793 (2008) (addressing exhaustion under § 2241
as a prudential doctrine)
130
See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, 2 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 42.2 (2019) (discussing
exhaustion in immigration cases); El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d
742, 746 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies is statutorily required only if appellees are
seeking to attack a final order of deportation or exclusion. We have joined a number of other circuits in drawing a
distinction between jurisdiction to rule on the merits of an individual deportation order and jurisdiction to rule on an
alleged pattern and practice of constitutional or statutory violations.”).
131
Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Where an immigration petitioner makes some effort
to put the Board on notice of an issue being raised on appeal, he or she may be deemed to have exhausted his or her
remedies.”).
132
See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 130 (listing exceptions for failure to exhaust such as “where exhaustion
would be futile… or where the agency or some other governmental official has interfered with the petitioner’s
ability to make effective use of the administrative or other remedy; or where the petitioner cannot practicably utilize
the remedy because of the imminence of removal or some other harm; or…. utilization of the administrative
procedure would serve no useful purpose; or where strict application… would result in a ‘manifest injustice.’”).
133
See, e.g., Rivera v. Holder, 307 F.R.D. at 552.
134
See, e.g., Order granting certification, Padilla v. United States ICE, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36473 at *14 (W.D.
Wash. 2019) (“[W]here a defendant's policies are immutable, a futile effort at administrative exhaustion is not
required.”); Cox v. Monica, 2007 WL 1804335 at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (accepting that appeal of classification under §
1226(c) would have been futile based on unpublished BIA cases that suggested the BIA had “predetermined the
issue before it”).
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“in several unpublished cases the BIA has concluded that an alien's ability to pay the bond
amount is not a relevant bond determination factor.” 135 Similarly, in Rivera, the court found
unpublished BIA decisions and the EOIR handbook sufficient evidence that exhaustion would be
futile on the issue of whether immigration judges must consider conditional parole. 136
f. Rule 23
Despite the skepticism of the Jennings concurrence about whether “habeas relief can be
pursued in a class action,” 137 the Supreme Court has reviewed other habeas class action cases,
including Preap, without appearing too concerned. 138 However, it is not obvious that Rule 23
even applies to habeas. The Conformity Clause of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states
that the rules—such as Rule 23— are applicable “to proceedings for habeas corpus … to the
extent that the practice in those proceedings: (A) is not specified in a federal statute, the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases, or the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases; and (B) has
previously conformed to the practice in civil actions.” 139 The Supreme Court declined to apply
another civil rule (interrogatories) to habeas because habeas practice had not conformed to that
practice when the Rules were enacted. 140 Although habeas practice did not include multiparty
actions when Rule 23 was enacted, courts have the power to utilize a similar procedure and rely
on Rule 23 by analogy when certifying habeas classes. 141 As the Ninth Circuit explained when
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d at 989. But see Paz Nativi v. Shanahan, 1:16-cv-08496 at *4 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 23,
2017) (dismissing an individual habeas claim petition raising ability to pay for failure to exhaust because the BIA
had no binding precedent on the issue).
136
Rivera v. Holder, 307 F.R.D. at 552.
137
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 858, fn. 7 (“This Court has never addressed whether habeas relief can be
pursued in a class action. I take no position on that issue here....”) (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations
omitted).
138
See, e.g., Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954; United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S. Ct.
1202 (1980) (discussing how mootness affected review of a denial of class certification of a habeas petition).
139
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 81(a)(4).
140
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294 (1969).
141
See United States ex. rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1125-26 (2d Cir. 1974) (determining that Rule 23 does
not govern habeas actions, but allowing a “multi-party proceeding similar to the class action” anyway); Bijeol v.
Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1975) (agreeing that “a representative procedure analogous to the class action
135
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affirming the certification of a habeas class in Ali v. Ashcroft, “although Rule 23 might be
‘technically inapplicable to habeas corpus proceedings,’ the courts have ‘applied an analogous
procedure by reference to Rule 23.’” 142
Even as district courts apply the requirements of Rule 23 to habeas classes, it is not clear
whether those requirements are a ceiling or a floor. 143 The majority in Jennings implied that Rule
23, and the required level of analysis under it, applies to habeas by instructing the lower court to
reconsider whether a class action continued to be appropriate to litigate fact-specific due process
claims in light of Dukes. 144 District courts appear to apply the exact same analysis when
certifying habeas classes as for any other certification under Rule 23, though.
The first requirement of 23(a), numerosity, is not generally contested in the immigration
detention context. 145 In Abdi v. Duke, the court found that numerosity was satisfied for a
proposed class of asylum seekers who had passed a credible fear interview and been detained at a
certain detention center for over six months even though the petitioners could only identify 28
class members. 146 It reasoned that the situation was analogous to class actions in prison litigation

provided for in Rule 23 may be appropriate in a habeas corpus action under some circumstances”); HERTZ &
LIEBMAN, supra note 10 at § 11.4, fn 9 (providing examples of habeas class actions). But see Belgrave v. Greene,
2000 US Dist. LEXIS 18648 at *15-16 (D. Colo. 2000) (determining that while a Rule 23-style multi-party action
was possible, it would be inappropriate in those circumstances).
142
Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 891 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1976))
(opinion withdrawn on other grounds by Ali v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Rodriguez v.
Hayes, 591 F.3d at 1117 (9th Cir. 2010) (“While ‘ordinarily disfavored,’ the Ninth Circuit has recognized that class
actions may be brought pursuant to habeas corpus.”).
143
Compare Bertrand v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1020, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[M]ore stringent standards of
commonality may apply to group habeas actions.”) with Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d at 968 (“[W]e need not decide
whether the District Court complied with the precise provisions of Rule 23 [, which] are not applicable to these
proceedings.”) (internal citations omitted).
144
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 851-52.
145
See, e.g., Order granting certification of the classes, Padilla v. United States Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36473 at *6 (“Defendants do not challenge this element, and the Court finds
that the requirement for numerosity has been satisfied.”); Cabrera Diaz v. Hott, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 626
(“Respondents do not challenge petitioners' ability to satisfy the numerosity and adequacy requirements”); Brito v.
Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 144 (“apparently conceding that the numerosity and adequacy of class counsel requirements
are met…”).
146
Abdi v. Duke, 323 F.R.D. 131, 140 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (decertified on other grounds, Abdi v. McAleenan, No.
1:17-cv-00721 EAW, 2019 WL 4621898 (W.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2019)).
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in that “the fluid composition of a prison population is particularly well-suited for class status,
because, although the identity of the individuals involved may change, the nature of the wrong
and the basic parameters of the group affected remain constant.” 147
Adequacy is likewise not usually a highly contested issue, and usually arises when the
named plaintiff’s claim varies from some class members in a significant way. 148 For instance,
plaintiffs in Gayle v. Warden sought to certify a class of § 1226(c) detainees, asserting that the
form they were provided upon entry to detention was inadequate notice of their right to a Joseph
classification hearing, and the procedures in those hearings violated due process. 149 The court
found that because the plaintiffs had received a different version of the form than current and
future class members, they could not adequately represent the class on that issue. 150 However,
the plaintiffs were adequate to represent the class on the due process claims, and it did not matter
that the representatives were all permanent residents while some class members lacked status,
because the due process analysis did not turn on status. 151
Commonality and typicality are generally addressed together, and depend on the specific
legal question being raised. One way the government argues commonality and typicality are not
met is by saying differences regarding types of detention or status between class members (or
between members and representatives) matter for the type of remedy a court can provide, but
those challenges will be overcome when the injury, such as a procedure that violates due process,

Id. (citing Dean v. Coughlin, 107 F.R.D. 331, 332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
See, e.g. Cabrera Diaz v. Hott, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 626 (“Respondents do not challenge petitioners' ability to
satisfy the… adequacy requirements.”). Adequacy of class counsel is even less of a concern, since the plaintiffs that
try to certify habeas classes always have lawyers, usually large impact litigation advocacy groups. See, e.g., Brito v.
Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 144 (D. Mass. 2019) (“conceding that the… adequacy of class counsel requirements are
met”).
149
Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188498 at *33 (D.N.J. 2017).
150
Id. at *34.
151
Id. at *55-56.
147
148
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is the same. 152 Subclasses are also used if relief between members necessarily varies based on
those differences. 153 Unlike civil rights classes alleging discrimination, classes of detainees don’t
face the same difficulty in showing “significant proof” of their common detention 154—no one is
disputing that they are detained or what the procedures are, only the legality of that detention.
Much of the commonality analysis in these cases overlaps with certification under Rule
23(b)(2), but Jennings added a new wrinkle to this prior pattern as well. Before reaching the
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit had held although class members were held under each of the
different detention schemes, that did not defeat commonality because they were all challenging
prolonged detention that had lasted over six months—the legality of which formed the “issue at
the heart of each class member's claim for relief.” 155 The Court in Jennings didn’t discuss
commonality directly, but it did ask the Ninth Circuit to reconsider whether certification was
appropriate under 23(b)(2) in light of Dukes. 156 Applying Dukes makes both commonality and
23(b)(2) more difficult in prolonged detention classes post-Jennings. 157 Now that the Court has
overturned the statutory reading of those clauses, and due process is all that could entitle class
members to a hearing following prolonged detention, it is possible that not all class members

See, e.g. Brito v. Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (holding that differences between class members who had received
a defective bond hearing and those who had not received a hearing did not defeat commonality because the burden
allocation question was the same); Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188498 at
*40 (“[E]ach proposed class member may have different facts underlying his or her immigration case and some may
not prevail in arguing that they are not ‘properly included’ in a mandatory detention category, but every proposed
class member is subject to the same allegedly unconstitutional Joseph standard and procedural deficiencies.”).
153
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d at 1123 (“To the extent… that the differing statutes authorizing detention
of the various class members will render class adjudication of class members' claims impractical… it may counsel
the formation of subclasses.”).
154
Cf. David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 792 (2016) (noting the difficulty of
proving commonality with evidence for public interest classes after Dukes).
155
See id. at 1122-23 (holding that the proposed class satisfied Rule 23); Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060,
1066 (9th Cir. 2016) (recounting the procedural history of the Rodriguez cases).
156
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 851-52.
157
See Shah, supra note 72 (explaining the hurdle Jennings created for due process class claims).
152
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have “suffered the same injury.” 158 Because due process may require a different outcome for
each class member, there may no longer be “a single injunction or declaratory judgment would
provide relief to each member of the class,” making certification under 23(b)(2) improper. 159
This has been a major difficulty for prolonged detention classes since then. On remand
from Jennings, the Ninth Circuit also remanded the certification question to the district court,
noting that the subclasses may need to be modified, but “certainly no process at all may be a
common characteristic of each of the statutes at issue.” 160 Likewise, the court in Reid v. Donelan
declined to decertify a § 1226(c) prolonged detention class post-Jennings. 161 It found
commonality and typicality were met even in the absence of a bright-line statutory rule because
“the class still presents the common threshold question of whether their detention after six
months without a bail hearing or reasonableness review violates the Constitution. Even if the
answer to that question is no, the class still meets the commonality requirement.” 162
In contrast, a district court that had previously certified a class of § 1225(b) immigrants
detained over six months in Abdi v. Duke, decertified the class after Jennings. 163 The court
determined that the now-invalidated statutory interpretation requiring bond hearings at six
months “was the linchpin to the Court's conclusion that individualized bond hearings could be
applied across-the-board to each putative class member….” 164 It rejected the argument that due

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349-350 (2011) (citing General Telephone Co. of Southwest v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982).
159
Id. at 360.
160
Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d at 255.
161
Reid v. Donelan, No. 13-30125, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181700 (D. Mass. Oct. 23, 2018).
162
Id. at *14-16 (summary judgement granted in part, Reid v. Donelan, 390 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D. Mass. 2019). The
petitioners suggested the government should conduct a reasonableness review every six months, rather than force
each detainee to litigate that reasonableness through habeas, but the court ultimately disagreed. Reid v. Donelan, 390
F. Supp. at 220-21.
163
Abdi v. McAleenan, No. 1:17-cv-00721 EAW, 2019 WL 4621898 (W.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2019).
164
Id. at *16 (internal citations omitted).
158
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process alone required bond hearings after six months. 165 Because the due process analysis
would need to be individualized, it held the class no longer satisfied commonality or 23(b)(2). 166
Although Rule 23(b)(2) is the natural and most popular choice for habeas classes
challenging legal aspects of immigration detention, 167 they can also be certified under
23(b)(1)(A) and (B). For example, Hernandez certified the class under 23(b)(1)(A) and (B), as
well as (b)(2), because of the risk that individual petitions asserting a constitutional requirement
to consider ability to pay in bond hearings could result in inconsistent adjudications on that
question, which would create conflicting directives for immigration judges, and would affect
nonparties subject to that same practice. 168 Certification under 23(b)(1) might provide a way
around the problem of whether any legal determination regarding due process could provide
relief to an entire class in the prolonged detention classes following Jennings. Even if flexible
concepts of due process might not require a bond hearing at six months, individual petitions
might result in inconsistent adjudications that require immigration judges to take different
actions in similar circumstances. Those determinations could be dispositive of nonparties’
interests in similar cases—and would disproportionately leave petitioners that cannot afford
counsel or file a pro-se habeas petition without any protections at all.
III.

Conclusion: The Importance of Habeas Class Actions in Immigration Detention
Whether a habeas class can overcome the above obstacles will depend on the specific

legal issue and the class definition. But despite the difficulties, the need for large-scale litigation
is clear. Immigration detention affects a record number of individuals every year, and its moral

Id. at *22-23 (“While certain principles arising out of criminal jurisprudence may be somewhat analogous to civil
immigration detention, the cases relied upon by Petitioners do not compel the conclusion that a six-month bright-line
rule is mandated by the Constitution.”).
166
Id. at *33.
167
See, e.g., Brito v. Barr, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (certifying the class under 23(b)(2)).
168
Hernandez v. Lynch, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191881 at *56-58.
165
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and economic costs are devasting. 169 In fiscal year 2018, almost 400,000 people were booked
into ICE custody, and over 240,000 into Customs and Border Patrol custody. 170 The Department
of Homeland Security has come under fire for abysmal conditions in detention centers, including
by its own Inspector General, which has reported on overcrowding, spoiled food, a lack of basic
hygiene materials, unjustified strip searches, and abuse of solitary confinement in detention
facilities. 171 Medical care is frequently delayed or inadequate, 172 with at least 24 immigrants
dying in U.S. custody during the Trump administration alone, including seven children. 173 And
despite being civil in name, “detention promotes beliefs among detainees that the legal system is
punitive,… that legal rules are inscrutable by design, and that legal outcomes are arbitrary.” 174
Habeas class actions are a necessary backstop against these excesses and arbitrary
executive detention of immigrants. They provide one of the few ways to challenge the complex
immigration detention scheme in a uniform manner, particularly given the barriers to habeas
relief for the vast majority of detainees, the ever-expanding size of immigration detention, and
the aggressive Congressional restriction of judicial review. Courts should exercise their power to
hear habeas class actions consistent with the principles behind both habeas corpus and Rule 23.

See Manning & Stumpf, supra note 1 at 415 (“Aggregating the number of people detained in connection with
civil immigration proceedings and those incarcerated for immigration-related crimes results in a big number: over
half a million individuals in custodial facilities.”); Detention by the Numbers, FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS,
https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/detention-statistics (last visited Dec. 2, 2019) (providing data on the costs of
detention, which are nearly $150 per person per day in some states, and primarily benefit private detention
companies).
170
Kate Sullivan & Jeff Mason, Immigration Detention in the United States: A Primer, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER
(Apr. 24, 2019) https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/immigration-detention-in-the-united-states-a-primer/.
171
Priscilla Alvarez, DHS Watchdog Finds Expired Food, Dilapidated Bathrooms Amid ‘Egregious’ Conditions at
ICE Facilities in 2018, CNN (June 7, 2019) https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/06/politics/ice-detention-center-igreport/index.html.
172
See generally CODE RED: THE FATAL CONSEQUENCES OF DANGEROUSLY SUBSTANDARD MEDICAL CARE IN
IMMIGRATION DETENTION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 2018), available at: https://www.aclu.org/report/code-redfatal-consequences-dangerously-substandard-medical-care-immigration-detention.
173
Madeleine Joung, What is Happening at Migrant Detention Centers? Here’s What to Know, TIME (July 12, 2019)
https://time.com/5623148/migrant-detention-centers-conditions/.
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Ryo, supra note 22 at 108.
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Allowing habeas class actions is consistent with the principles behind Rule 23 class
actions. They promote judicial economy, especially as immigration detention grows
exponentially. Class actions in the immigration detention context also promote basic fairness to
the detainees, who often lack English proficiency, cannot afford a lawyer, are isolated from
support systems, and are unfamiliar with the U.S. legal system. 175 Expecting each detainee to
challenge his or her detention through an individual habeas petition is patently unrealistic, and
would flood the courts if it did happen. The modern version of Rule 23 was designed in the
1960s with civil rights class actions in mind. 176 As the cases above show, immigration detention
class actions address civil rights issues such as discrimination on the basis of poverty, conditions
of detention, and due process protections. As such, they fit squarely within the model of public
interest impact litigation that “evolve[d] in lockstep” with the class action. 177
Similarly, allowing habeas class actions in the immigration detention context is consistent
with the principles behind habeas. As the Supreme Court said in St. Cyr, “At its historical core,
the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention,
and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” 178 As recent years have shown,
the operation of immigration detention is largely subject to the whims of the executive. 179 And
no matter how long it lasts, or which statute authorizes it, it is a restriction of liberty in every
sense, in which detainees are confined to jails for months or years at a time if they exercise their
right to pursue immigration relief. Habeas class actions in the immigration detention context thus

See Marouf, supra note 44 at 2150-51 (describing the how detention inflicts financial, physical, and emotional
hardship, as well as makes it difficult to successfully pursue relief); Ryo, supra note 22 at 105 (describing
difficulties for non-English and non-Spanish speaking inmates).
176
Marcus, supra note 154 at 783.
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Marcus, supra note 154 at 783, 785.
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I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301.
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See generally SARAH PIERCE, IMMIGRATION-RELATED POLICY CHANGES IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (May 2019), available at:
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-policy-changes-two-years-trump-administration.
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provide an invaluable tool for protecting liberty and ensuring due process for the tens of
thousands of people detained by the executive branch every day.

